McSes of cognition are postulated consistmg of third-and fourth-order operations, they are hypothesized to be qualitatively disbntt from, and hierarchically related to, the form of reasoning characterized as formal operational by Inhelder and Piaget An instrument was developed to assess these modes of cogmtion, labeled systemahc and metasvstemabc reasomng, and was administered to 110 undergraduate and graduate students Tbe results support tbe asserbon tbat systemabc and metasystematic reasoning exist as modes of cogmbon discrete from, and more complex and powerful tban, formal operational reaiomng Tbe purpose of the present paper is to explore the possibibty tbat modes of systematic reasonmg can be identified tbat are qualitatively distinct from, and logically more complex than, the form of reasonmg charactenzed by Inhelder and Piaget (1958) as "formal operabonal " In this endeavor, we have made use of Piaget's system of successive stages of logical operabons only m its most general form In other words, Piaget's stages are regarded as successive levels of cognitive representation, in this sense, the stages are not subject to any form of empmcal venfication, but rather consbtute a conceptual descnpbon of forms of cognition (Bickhard 1979) Tbus, sensory-motor operations are defined as acbons on matenal objecrts, symbohc operations as actions or operations on symbobc representabons of matenal objects (eg, the concrete operabonal organizabon of symbohcally represented objects into classes or relabons), and formal operations as operations on the above-mentioned operations (of classificabon or relabon), for example, the mdividual organizes classes (of elements) according to relabons that obtain among them The object of the present work was to mqmre whether levels of mgher-order operations could be identified and, if so, to estabhsh the particular form they would take m tbe cognitive performance of the individual There are several existing attempts m the developmental literature to postulate "postformal operational" stages of cognition, notablv tbose of Riegel (1973) and Arlin (1975) Tbe major problem with these formulations is that it IS uncertain the extent to which these vanous postulated modes of cognition consbtute a qualitatively distmct structure or stage of reasoning, related m a hierarchical manner to formal operations, or, alternatively, whether they are modes of cognition that develop parallel to Piaget's stage sequence Forms of Arlin's stage of "problem finding," for example, are likely to be present during the stages of concrete and formal operations (Fakoun 1976), thus, the stage of forma! operabons cannot be regarded as the necessary but insufficient condition for the stage of problem finding, as it would need to be if the two were to be related m a hierarchical manner A similar consideration applies to Riegel's "dialectic operations" As Riegel (1973) noted, dialectical operabons are potentially present in some form at all of Piaget's stages It IS our view, then, that if forms of advanced cognition are to be identified that make
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In executing these formal operations, bowever, the individual does not self-consciously represent, reflect, or operate on the system as a whole We postulate, then, a possible set of third-order operations, termed "systematic operations," which consist of exhaustive operations on classes or relations of classes or relations, forming systems We further postulate the possibility of a set of fourth-order operations, termed "metasystematic operabons," vvhicb consist of operabons on systems Systemabc operabons apply to the entire set of constituents of a system (that itself is made up of operations on operations) For example, they might consist of the coordination of lterabve operations such as 2< or the ccwrdination of abstract representations of operations, such as a O b, a * b, to form systems Such systemabc descnptions formally represent the properties of operations at the formal operational level Metasystematic operations are cxignitions about systems They are reqmred m the formation of a framework (or "metasystem") for companng and contrasting systems with one another The relabonship of one system to another such system is expressed as a metatheory and 's found by companng axioms, theorems, or other limiting condibons of systems withm the Commons, Richards, and Knhn 1059 framework of a "super-system" that contains all of tbe vanant systems Metasystemabc reasoning IS defined as tbe set of operations necessary to construct tbe supersystem and to execute the analysis of the systems contained therein An example of metasystematic reasonmg is found in that aspect of Einstein's general tbeory of relativity that deals with tbe coordmation of mertial and gravitabonal mass Pnor to Emstem's formulabon, tbere was one system for describing mertial mass and a separate one for descnbing gravitational mass Each separate system mcluded systematic representabons of properties of formally defined relations between variables Inertial mass was tbe property of the svstem that described a body's resistance to acceleration Gravitational mass was a property of another system that descnbed the weight of a body in a given gravitational field In fact, since the same constant for mass represents botb the inertia and the weight of a body, it follows that it IS impossible to discover by experiment which of the following is true "The motion of a given system of coordmates is straight and uniform and the observed effects within the system are due to a gravitabonal field, or the system of coordinates is uniformly accelerated and the observed eflFects withm the system are due to inertia Recognition of an equivalence between tbe two cases constitutes the equivalence principle of general relativity theory This prmciplc states tbat tbe inertial system is isomorphic (contains the same structure and elements) to the gravitational system, that is, any relabonsbip tbat IS true m one is true m the other Wbetber the same property appears as weight or as inertia depends on which descnpbon of the coorchnate systems is employed, that is, motion m a gravitational field appears m relation to an mertial system of coordmates, while motion m the absence of a gravitational field appears in a coordinate system that is accelerated This pnnciple requires a coordmabon of two disbnct systems, eacb generated by systemabc of)erations the mertial system and the gravitational system The cogmbve operations that effect this coordination are at a "metasystematic" level, disbnct from that of the operabons apphed within either of the lnchvidual systems
The above example serves to illustrate the irreducibility of the higher-order operabons to operabons of the next lower order Operabons at the metasystemabc level must be expressed in the language of metalogic, or its psychological equivalent, because statements about tbe relation between systems cannot be reduced to statements about the properties of tbe relabons withm any single system Similarly, statements about systems properbes cannot be contamed within any of the individual systems Hence, systematic operations cannot be reduced to formal operations because the formal operabonal systems themselves do not contam descaipbons of the system These formal operations are not nch enough to describe their own properbes If this were possible, Russell's paradox (the sentence, "This sentence is false") would not exist In otber words, a property of a system cannot be descnbed by a proposibon within a system
Method

Task
In the problem we developed to assess systematic and metasystematic reasonmg, the subject was asked to compare and contrast four systems, each compnsecf of a set of asymmetnc relations Two similar forms of the problems were constructed One form of the problem and tbe mstrucAions given to the subject are shown below
Here are four stones After you read tbem, you will answer quesbons on wbic^ are most similar and wbicJi most different Use tbe "greater tban" symbol ">" to mdicate tbe order of dungs For example, mdicate "Brown prefers Oregon over Texas, by O > r Only attend to order 1) On counter eartb, Ricbard Reagan bas been elected Prraident of tbe Umted States As a gesture of gratitude to tbe people of bis bome state, Cabforma, Reagan bas convmced tbem to leave Cabforma and eitber wander around witb no state, or take a combinabon of one, two, or tbree of tbe following states Oregon, Wasbmgton, and Indiana Reagan dunks tbat tbe economic value of Oregon and Wasbmgton are equal, and tbat tbe value of eitber IS less tban tbat of Indiana Tbe boundary and passport bill wbicb be submitted to Congress, requinng tbe barbed winng and mining of tbe boundanes at considerable expense, did not pass Instead, Congress specified tbat die funds asked for m tbat bill were to go to tbe states selected to be used as tbe states saw fit Only Wasbmgton and Oregon bave common boundanes and, tberefore, a union of tbese two states would receive a smaller amount of tbe forbficabon funds Tberefore, even witb tbe value (rf tbeir combined economies, Reagan tbmks diat tbe pair Oregon and Wasbmgton is less valuable tban the pairs Oregon and Indiana or Wasbington and Indiana Since Indiana makes boats wbicb can be used on tbe Columbia River, Reagan tbmks tbat tbe economic benefits of painng Wasbington and Indiana are sbgbtly greater tban tbe benefits of painng Oregon and Indiana Reagan tbinks tbat tbree states are wortb more tban any combinabon of 0, 1, or 2 states, and any 2 states are wortb more tban 0 or 1 states, except be cannot decide wbicb IS wortb more, Indiana or tbe pair Oregon and Wasbmgton 2) Bad Bart ambles into the local casino and converts his gold watcb into cbips of tbe followmg colors silver, bronze, and gold Bart bkes to play the one-chip candy machines He bkes tbe cbijps m the following order gold better tban silver, alver better than bronze, and gold better tban bronze, and any cbip over none Bart also bkes to play tbe one-armed bandit macbines wbicb use combinations of two cbips He likes tbe two-cbip combmabons m tbe following order golds and silvers first, golds and bronzes second, and silvers and bronzes tbird Witb one excepbon, Bart knows be bkes to play •mth any two cbips over one or none, be is not sure about a gold versus a silver and a bronze Because Bad Bart bkes to play witb tbree cbips best, tbere is one macbine tbat be bkes better tban any otber tbe wasbmg macbine, and it takes a silver, a bronze, and a gold cbip 3) In Madras, India, V P Vanktesb, a man of babit and vanable income, bas a favonte restaurant Altbougb bis tastes never vary, tbe fcwd be can afford does Of tbe tbree fcxxls tbe restaurant serves be prefers curry, biram, and alu paratba, m tbat order Also, be likes curry better tban alu paratba, and anytbing better tban notbmg Wben V P bas more money be buys two disbes, except it is not known wbetber be would cboose tbe curry over botb tbe biram and tbe alu paratba He bkes tbe combinabon of cnirry and biram better tban currj and alu paratba, <tnd be also likes curry and alu paratba better tban birani and alu paratba, and biram and alu paratba better tban curry and birani Altbougb a temperate man, at fesbvals, given tbe means, be bas all tbree disbes instead of any single dish or pair 4) A jeweler has three boxes, tbe first containing different bnds of broken 18-carat gold necklaces, tbe second vanous scratcbed earrings, and the third different kinds of 18-carat gold pins tbat are broken He keeps tbe old jewelry because be occasionally uses tbe gold T'o get tbe approximate amount of gold be needs, be weigbs and tben melts down a combination of objects To do tbe weigbmg be uses a simple balance-beam scale It consists of a beam tbat pivots m die middle and two pans banging from eacb end of tbe beam, equidistant from tbe pivot Tbe beam is level wben tbe pans are empty Tbe jeweler can place combinations of from 0 to 3 object types into one pan, but never more tban one of eacb object type m a pan Beginmng witb empty pans, be nobces tbat wbenever be puts any combmabon contaimng at least one object into a pan, tbat pan sinks down, indicabng that It IS heavier than tbe empty pan Using tbis same metbod, be finds tbat any pm is beavier tban any eamng Necklaces are always beavier tban pins He bas discovered two rules tbat reduce bow many combinabons be needs to try to find out bow tbe weigbts of tbe combinations are ordered First, he nobces tbat if tbe combinabon m tbe rigbt pan IS beavier tban tbe combmabon in tbe left pan, and a sin^e object type not already in eitber of the pans is added to both pans, tbe ngbt pan remains beavier tban tbe left Secondly, if be weigbs three combmabons of objects, be finds tbat tbe following IS always true If tbe first combinabon is heavier tban tbe second, and tbe second beavier than the third, tben the first is heavier tban tbe tbird Space was left after each story for subjects to make notations On a separate page, the following instructions were presented Now that you have read the stones and are famihar with tbem, answer the quesbons below Make your compansons on the basis of properties of tbe ordenngs found in eacb story, m die best and most complete wav tbat you can Wnte out all the compansons tbat you c»n in a systematic way Use symbols to represent tbe order of tbings, and explain wbat tbe symbols stand for Also mclude an explanation m English You may want to use a Oregon cham, for example, ^ , in addibon to an orderTexas mg, Oregon > Texas Tben explain wbat are tbe most important similanbes and differences m tbe stones, and explain bow you amved at deciding the relative importance of tbese similanties and differences You may refer to more tban one framework Make sure to give tbe strongest, most thorough, broad, inclusive, and complete explanabons possible for tbe similanties and differences It is necessary tbat you sbow all of your work in formmg the orders and making tbe compansons, as well as your commentary in Engbsb
The following form was used for subjects to provide their answers Space was provided for subject's answer Ê ach of the four systems withm the problem consists of a finite, parbally ordered, commutative semigroup, with a bmary operabon for combining objects and a parbal order relabon defined among all possible combmations of elements The systems were presented as stones about which combmations of three objects, a, b, c, were greater tban others The combmabons could include no item, single items, or two or tbree items In tbe first three stones, for the most part, the ordenngs of combinabons of objects were exphcitly stated One object is preferred over another, or over none at all, for example, o over none, c over b, b over a, and so forth, some pairs are prefened over others, for example, fo -f-c over a + b, or tbe complete group IS preferred over a pair, for example, a -i-h -\-c over fc -f c In the fourth story, the structure of the order was stated m propositional form which did not provide direct access to the ordenngs of tbe elements, these bad to be denved by the subject An alternate form B was presented to a portion of the sample Forms A and B were identical except for the structure reflected m story 1 (see fig 1) and tbe names of the elements in each of the stones, for example, the names of the states m story 1 and the foods m storv 3
The subject was allowed an unlimited amount of time The average amount of bme spent was 1 hour, with an approximate range from 30 nun to 2 hours Two additional problems were presented to a portion of the sut)jects (73 of the 110) a simple transibvity problem (requinng concrete operations) and a version of Inhelder and Piaget's (1958) pendulum problem (requirmg formal operabons) Problem order was counterbalanced It was bypotbesized that performance on the three problems would show a hierarchical pattem, that is, no subject would master the pendulum problem who did not master the transitivity problem, and no subject would master Tbis problem is used with tbe permission of tbe Dare Associabon, Inc the multisystem problem who did not master the pendulum problem Subjects The 110 subjects were 39 undergraduates and 71 graduate students attendmg one of several pnvate umversibes m the Northeast The mean ages for the groups are 20 6 and 26 1 years, respecbvely All parbcipated on a volunteer basis The mulbsystem problem was administered a second tune to 41 of the 71 graduate students, direcdy followmg the mitial admmistration for 22 of tbem, and^ 8 months followmg the mibal admmistrabon for 19 of them (Half of the students received form A first, the other half form B first)
Results
Analysis of subjects' protocols suggested SIX chstmc:t levels of response. The sconng system was developed based on an mtensive analysis of 25 of the protocols, gmded by the theorebcal perspecbve set forth m the introduction It was then apphed to the remainmg 85 Fiftyfive of the 85 protocols were evaluated mdependently by raters 1 (first author) and 2 (research assistant), 61 of the 85 protocols by raters 1 and 3 (research assistant) There was 76% and 62* agreement, respecbvely Differences were resolved by discussion and a final level assigned to each protocol Level C -The lmbal level, labeled C, resembles the mode of thinking termed concnrete operational in Piaget's system Subjects categonzed in this level base their judgments of similanty/dissimilanty on superficaal features of the stones rather than on order relabons (either withm or across stones), as the task mstrucbons direcjt If order relabons are attended to at all this attenbon is hmited to a representabon of the discrete order relabons exptiatly given in the story The subject does not perform anv operations on these elements, to denve addi tional order relations or more general properbes of the system (story) Subject RA provides an example (The examples to follow are based on both form A and form B, so that letters may not always match the stones given earher ) (3 > 2 > 1) comb , right pan , left pan RA then wrote "Stories 1, 2, and 3 are most similar because in the first tbree stones a person's opinion is involved He thinks, or he likes, or he prefers, a parbcular object or a combination of objects, and if another person were to make a choice on what he would prefer of such combinations, the combinations would l)e likely to change (e g , some people may hke wbite chips better than blue) At the same time, storv 4 IS based on facts, and if tbe jeweler were replaced, the facts about the combinabons would still be true " Note tbat RA does not link information from discrete order relations into a higher-order unit or cham (though we know RA IS capable of a transitivity inference) B > R, R > W, and B > W are not integrated into a unified order relation B > R>W Level F-Tbis level is postulated to be equivalent to the level of formal operations in Piaget's sequence (Piaget's levels IIIA & B, see Inhelder & Piaget [1958] ) Order relations within stories are operated on in a systemabc manner, but the entire system is not regarded (operated on) as a single entity having characteristic properties that may be compared with the properties of other systems Thus, the subject's attempt to relate the stones with respect to Aeir similarity/dissimilarity is hmited to establishing that single elements or two-element order relations map to some degree from one of 
O), whereas tbis is not true of story 3 (C>B> A)
The other difference is that the Califomians may or may not benefit most from taking J + O over W, whereas Vanktesh definitely would take all three " Level S -Responses at this level reflect the application of what we have termed systematic reasonmg At this level, subjects clearly show that tbey understand tbat the logical stmcture of each story must be examined as an integral whole or structure In represenbng the structure of each story, the subject may choose one of two possible courses A schemabc representation of each of the systems can be generated and these representabons compared with respect to their deviations from one another Alternatively, the subject can represent the sv stems on the basis of the axioms that do or do not charactenze each of the systems The two methods yield equivalent results Use of these representabons is taken as evidence that the subject perceives the story as a system, that IS, a coherent wbole which determmes tbe mtemal pattem of relabons across its elements Wben systematic operations are fully consohdated, full representations are constructed There is no evidence for the presence of a framework for intersystem companson, cognition IS focused on mtrasystem analysis Subject NJ provides an example Under story 1, NJ wrote
O=W,O<I,W<I, 0-{-W>0 + I, O+W>W-\-I, W + I>O-{-I,
0-if-W-hl >W + 0, O + I>W, 0+ W> I, I-{-W>0
Under story 2, NJ wrote
G> S, S> B, G> B, G> 0, B>0, S>0, G-|-S>G-f-B>
5-1-5, G = B-|-5, G-t-B>5, -f-O>/>, Cr-|-O-i-75>Cr-1-O>
Under story 3, NJ wrote
C>B>^, OA, OO, A>0, B>0, C = B + A, C + B> A, C + A> B + A , B + A>C+B, A + B + C>B + A , A + C , B + C, A, B, C
Under story 4, NJ wrote i V >C», E>0, P>0, P> E, N > P (Note that story 4 is mcompletely represented ) NJ then wrote "1 and 2 berth use the techmque Under story 1 OC wrote
I>0=W, O
0+»f'> fortify >0 + /, W + l, of companng items m regard to their relabve ment on a one-to-one basis, then m pairs In addibon, the relative worth of combmabon versus smgle Item and versus zero is analyzed. 1 and 2 also follow the transitive law of geometry, that IS * > y and y> z, then x > z The law holds for 1 and 2, whereas it fails m example 3 In 3, B -t-A > C -I-B, then by takmg away B, A> C, but this contradicts what we are told before I realize, however, that Mr Vanktesh's preferences need not follow mathematical laws and logic, he may mdeed prefer the B 4-A combinabon better I pomt this out because I felt this made 3 less similar to 1 than 2 was to 1 " NJ's reasoning is characrtenzed by an effort to descnbe differences across stones Stones are compared m a pairwise fashion m this effort, evidence for the lack of a systematic framework for companson Ml -^At this level the first evidence of metasystemabc operabons appears Compansons across stones are based on vanabons of the structural properbes, lmpbcatly incbcating tbe possibibty of conceptualizmg one story as the transformabon of another story At level Afl, the subject generates a much more complete set of lattices and/or axioms to represent or charactenze the stones However, some axioms or ordenngs necessary to complete the analysis are clearly missmg Subject CC serves as an example by providing only a parbal analysis of story 4 (leavmg out the details of its ordenng and leavmg out the smgle combinations of tbe elements) Subject CC's analysis is as foUows are not expbcitly spelled out, there is enough mformabon to deduce that a combination of 3 > combmabons of 2 > singles In story 2, the relabonship is also the same, though there is sbght uncertamty as to the relabonship between SB and G Nonetheless, this uncertamty IS not enough to change the order of the relabonships the way it does in stones 1 and 3 "
It IS clear that CC's reasonmg and representations could be earned further On the other band, CC does use "circnilanty" and uncertainty of order to refer to the integrated stones as wholes, and she generates latbces for three stones Struc^re is compared across stones, even though incorrectly "The use of circularity and "uncertamty" indicates the existence of a common "source structure" whose properbes are altered to produce the different instanbations of structure found m the stones emergence of truly metasystemabc operabons This level, and the two which foDow it, are progressive steps in the consobdation and orgamzabon mto a wbole, of operabons mvolved m compansons across systems Subjects at this level have, either exphcidy or lmphcatly, full and mtegrated representabons of the systems of ordered relations reflected m each of the four stones (Systemabc thinkmg is now fully consohdated ) These representabons are used to check (again either expbcitly or impbcidy) their assertions about the systems in a systemabc and complete fashion ITiese subjects choose a single property which is appropnate for cx)mpanng the mtegrated strucjtures of the stones, as opposed to one that would enable compansons of parts only For example, the subject might compare tbe stories on the basis of either additivity or transitivity properbes Such properties are used to construct companson frameworks For a subject who represents the systems underlying the stories graphically, the companson framework may consist simply of a set of dimensions along which the physical drawmgs of the systems are tested for resemblance A subject may imply that he orshe-bas^enerated complete ordenngsjn-«fr"four stones without actually showing the work Thus, the simple assertion that "stones 2 and 4 follow the law of addibvity while 1 and 3 do not," is enough to classify a subject at level M2 (In protocols classified at levels Ml or S, m contrast, there exists clear evidence that certain combinabons, 1 e, relabons between elements, were not considered in generabng the representabon ) Subject BR provides an example of level M2 
RR then wrote
My inibal reaction was to pick 1 and 2 However, 1 does not seem as logically simple as 2 and 4 do 1 seems to look at several vanables wben evaluating tbe relationsbip between tbe states (le, fortificabon, economic values) Altbougb you coidd end up witb an ordered ranking for 1, tben it is not stnc^tly logical tbat W + I>O + 1 Vanktesb does not follow a strictly additive pattem eitber Combinabons of tbings are not always tbe sum of tbe parts I guess tbat is wby I piclred 2 and 4 as most similar 4 especially follows tbe rule that tbe sum of die parts equals tbe value of tbe wbole 2 and 4 you (x>uld predict tbe rankings given basic information (except possibly for Bart's besitancy over G vs 5 -j-B) (BR concluded tbat stones 1 and 3 were most different ) Tbe reason wby 1 and 3 are dissimilar IS tbe flip side to wby 2 and 4 are similar 2 and 4 seem very logical to me Tbey were relabvely easv to decode because tbey followed wbat one expected Story 3 bad some completely unexpected elements to it I do not understand bow C -j-B can be at once more preferable and less preferable to tbe same combmabons of disbes Tberefore tbe reason tbat 3 is very dissimilar is tbat it IS not logical or predictable or understandable I read 3 at least 5 tunes trying to figure out wbere I made a mistake in lnterprebng tbe rankings But I cannot find any errors in my tianslabon So 1 bave to assume tbat it is Vanktesb tbat is confused If I did make a mistake I would like vefy mucb to bear back from you regarding tbe actual ranking of tbe disbes
Level MS-At level M3, the subject understands the ambiguity of the questions reqmnng judgments of similanty and dissimilarity Individuals understand that there exists a mulbphcity of chmensions which could provide the basis for such judgments, that is, a mulbplicity of companson frameworks Tbe level M3 subject deals with this ambiguity by expenmenting with a number of c»mpanson frameworks and companng and lntegrabng the results of each This reasomng can still be of a nontechnical sort, because the properties m terms of which tbe systems vary are not comphcated ones The lattices of stones 2 and 4 are lsomorphic (see fig 1) , the same set of axioms apphes to both Story 1 violates lrreflexibihty, smce two states are equally preferred Story 3 violates transibvity, a more senous violabon The level M3 subject understands that lack of transibvity means that one no longer bas an order, whereas the inclusion of an equahty rather than an lneciuality with some indetermmacy on addibon sbll means that one has an order, although partial Therefore, the former constitutes a more senous deviation Another way to see the senousness of the deviabon is to examine what happens in the transformation from one system. A, to another system, B Sxidi a transformabon causes a loss m mformabon to the extent that the two systems are not lsomorphic This is seen when tbe reverse transformation is performed Thus, the result of transforming system A mto system B and then back into A (by another transformation) must be judged from a multiplicity of frameworks Subject HC provides an example of level M3 Subject HC supplies the analyses that appears at the bottom of page 1067 HC then wrote Stones 2 and 4 are die most similar because m eacb tbe same laws are estabbsbed for ranking Kacb allows only two possible rankings (outcomes) wbicb anse because of uncertamW as to wbetber one item c»nies a bigber ranking than tbe sum of tbe two otbers, or vice versa If tbe uncertamties were settled tbe same way in botb problems (l e , tbe one item sum of tbe otber two, or vice versa) tbe same ranking would bave been estabbsbed for eacb A possible difference between stones 2 and 4-tbe fact tbat (not stated) m story 2, one-armed bandit macbmes inigbt use two of die same c»lor cbip, wbereas in story 4 it was specified tbat only one item of eacb type could be used-was eliminated by assuming tbat tbe bierarcby of preferences for eacb combmabon of two dnps in story 2 represented tbe complete possible cboice of performance Tberefore, two cbi^ of tbe same color were not a possible cboice Refer to my above diagram [p 1067] wbere it is sbown tbat tbe laws developed in story 4 are the same as those tbat govern story 2 Notabons witbin tbe section for story 2 prove tbis m tbe diagrams of story 2 Story 3 is tbe most different because it violates botb laws by wbicb 2 and 4 are bound and because tbe lnformabon does not bmit you to only two possible rankings Story 1 is similar to stones 2 and 4 in tbat tbe laws eiven are adequate for determining tbat tbere are only two possible rankings However, one of tbe laws used m 2 and 4 is violated and tbe otber does not apply to 1 Story 3 is most different from stones 2 and 4 because (1) It does not set fortb tbe same laws as tbose governing stones 2 and 4, m fact violabng botb of tbem, and (2) tbe laws governing the preference for combinabons of two items are circular, l e , sucb tbat more tban two possible rankings exist, even after tbe uncertainty of preference for cbicken over baklava and yogurt, or vice-versa, are removed L^vel M4 -^Though no examples of level M4 have ocxairred in our research, so far, one can postulate this level as compnsed of an ldeahzed, maximally formahzed solution to the task and example of metasystemabc reasonmg At level M4, exphcat use is made of the transformational nobon Here, for mstance, it may be used to show how many changes of order there are in 28 pairs of combmations that are necessary to go from one story to another and then back to the ongmal There are other ways to assess the effects of the transformations back and forth Tlie degree to which the mforUnder story 1, HC wrote (Utah Commons, Richards, and Kuhn 1067 mation in a story may be recovered in a transformabonal process is a measure of its similarity The notion of an inverse transformation is used, and wbetber or not it can be performed without losing mformabon is shown The properties of the system are represented m a language that IS not particular to any one system Just as fully formal operational subjects in Pia- -B>H+R>B+R>U'>B>R get's system no longer need concrete values to be assigned to the elements to which their formal operations are appbed, at the level of idealized metasystemabc reasomng, the subject can operate on systems mdependent of their specific representabons The idealized level M4 performance, then, would consist of a general theory of systems of order relabons, within the framework of which any particular order system is evaluated Properbes of the axiom systems which are used to generate these systems, such as completeness, consistency, decidability, and so on, would be considered
Performance of Subjects m the Present Sample
The levels at which subjects m the present sample were categonzed are shown m table 1 The relabon between performance on the formal operabonal problem and performance on the multisystem problem is shown in table 2 All subjects passed the concrete operabonal (transibvity) problem, which mdicates that they functioned at least at the level of simple concrete operations The relabons reflecrted m table 2 are m accordance vvnth expectabon With only one exception, only those subjects who showed attainment of formal operations showed any level of profiaency in systemabc or metasystemabc reasoning Among the 41 graduate students who received multiple admimstrabons of the mulbsystem problem, most subjects showed no change or a sbgbt advance from first to secxmd adimnistration Twenty of tbe 41 sbowed no cbange, 14 advanced one level, one advanced two levels, one advanced four levels, and five dechned one level Tins change pattem chd not differ appreciably according to time that elapsed between admmistrations, which suggests that change was largely attnbutable to effects of repeated testmg
Discussion
The present results support our f>ostulation of discrete modes of cognition composed of third-order and fourth-order operabons Empirical support for the vahdity of the proposed construcits, labeled systemabc and metasystematic reasonmg, is of two sorts First, performance levels of the two samples (undergraduates and graduates) are in accordance wnth exjjectation Few undergraduates show evidence of systematic or metasystemabc reasoning, its incidence is considerably greater, however, among graduate students Second, performance on the problem designed to assess svstemabc and metasystematic reasoning shows the appropnate relation to performance on a task designed to assess formal operabonal rea soning Only one of 31 subjects who did not show fully formal operational reasonmg exhibited any proficiency in the use of systemabc or metasystemabc reasonmg, but not all subjects who were proficaent m formal operational reasoning exhibited proficiency m systemabc or metasystematic reasomng
The purpose of the present report has been to present the instrument we have developed to assess this higher-order reasoning and to de scnbe the performance of the imbal samples of subjects to whom the instrument has been admmistered It is, therefore, not appropriate in this report to embark on an extended discussion of the factors or condibons that may govern tbe development of such higher-order reasonmg To some extent, frmtful speculabon in this regard awaits fuller tmderstanding of mechanisms of cogmbve development (Kuhn, m press) We should comment, however, tbat the perfor mance differences between the undergraduate and graduate samples in the present study al most certainly reflect a combined ccmtnbubon of self-selecbon and differential expenence While the "general expenence" that comes with mcreasmg chronological age appears to be a sufficient condition for attainment of the earher stages m Piaget's system, we would not expect it to be a sufficient condibon for mastery of the thought operations assessed m the present work Exposure to and expenence with problems that require abstract representabonal modes of analysis are undoubtedly necessary factors, but just how native ability, educ^bon, and expenence interact in this regard is a difBcnilt issue to address (see Commons, Richards, & Armon [in press ] for addibonal discussion)
The caveat mtroduced earher bears reiteration It IS not necessanly the case, and mdeed most unbkely, that all adult thought is of the form mvestigated here One of the pressmg issues m the study of adult cogmbve development, m fact, IS to discover the role that formal, logical/deductive reasoning plays m the realworld thought that occrurs in adulthood (GiUigan & Murphy 1979 , Kuhn et al, m press, Labouvie-Vief 1982 Nevertheless, withm the realm of logical hypothetical/deducbve thought studied by Piaget, levels of reasonmg beyond Piaget's formal operations in our view must be of the general form of third-order and fourthorder operabons that we have outbned It is too restncbve to say that systemabc and metasystematic operations are limited to the domains of mathematics and science Numerous other disciplines, such as literature, history, or anthropology, entail the evaluation of systems withm a multisystem framework It may be the case, however, that systemabc and metasystemabc reasomng is hmited to the domain of formal, abstract, as opposed to everyday, thought, m contrast to Piaget's formal operations which are discernible m everyday thinking Clearly, a good deal of further work will be required to estabbsh the vanety of forms that the systemabc and metasystematic reasomng ldenbfied in the task presented here may take
